This paper explores the role of uncertain government preferences for fiscal and monetary policy interaction. Our analysis shows that the uncertainty about government preferences does not affect the macroeconomic equilibrium if the fiscal multiplier is known. In the case of multiplicative uncertainty, uncertain government preferences make fiscal policy more contractionary, while monetary policy becomes more expansionary. This leads to higher expected inflation and lower expected output, which means a stronger inflation bias.
Introduction
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of any economic system. Therefore, macroeconomic agents, such as governments and central banks, should take uncertainty into account. This is emphasized in the economic literature (Estrella, Mishkin (1999) , Soderstrom (2002) , Lane (2003) , De Grauwe, Senegas (2006)).
In this paper we explore the role of uncertain government preferences for fiscal and monetary policy interaction. The economic impact of uncertainty depends on its origins. As Tinbergen (1952) and Theil (1958) show in the case of additive uncertainty, certainty equivalence holds. This means that this type of uncertainty does not change agent behaviour.
However, if uncertainty affects the loss function of the agent or the channels of policy transmission, an agent's optimal behaviour is not certainty equivalent. For example, for multiplicative uncertainty, agents do not have complete information about the magnitude of macroeconomic policy effects. As Brainard (1967) shows, in this situation the policymaker becomes less active in reacting to macroeconomic shocks. This phenomenon was called the Brainard conservatism principle by Blinder (1998) .
There is no consensus in the economic literature about the welfare effect of multiplicative uncertainty. Swank (1994) and Pearce, Sobue (1997) find that multiplicative uncertainty reduces inflation bias and, therefore increases social welfare. Kobayashi (2003) shows that even in the absence of inflation bias, multiplicative uncertainty leads to an increase in social welfare. Ciccarone, Marchetti (2009) emphasize that the findings of Kobayashi (2003) are correct only if the preferences of society and the central bank coincide.
Without doubt, multiplicative uncertainty should affect the interaction of the government and the central bank. A considerable part of the economic literature is devoted to fiscal and monetary policy interactions. Starting from Sargent, Wallace (1981) this topic has become especially popular. Tabellini (1986) , and Alesina, Tabellini (1987) developed a formal description of the strategic interaction of fiscal and monetary policy. Beetsma, Bovenberg (1999) consider a conflict of interest between the government and the central bank, namely the regulation of public debt and inflation. They show that all macroeconomic policy targets are achievable irrespective of whether the central bank is independent or not.
Another issue concerns the idea that both fiscal and monetary authorities can use their instruments to influence aggregate demand finding a compromise between output and inflation.
For example, Andersen, Schneider (1986) note that two independent authorities do not automatically guarantee the achievement of the target level of output. Blinder (1982) questions the idea that macroeconomic targets can be achieved under fiscal and monetary policy coordination. Dixit, Lambertini (2003a) also show that in equilibrium with the coordination of fiscal and monetary authorities, output is lower than the target level, while inflation is higher. Dixit, Lambertini (2003b) , however, show that fiscal and monetary policy can achieve macroeconomic targets if the government and the central bank share output and inflation targets.
This result holds even if the weight coefficients in the loss functions of the fiscal and monetary authorities are different.
While research on fiscal and monetary policy interaction is well-established, at present the role of uncertainty in this literature is limited. As a rare exception, Di Bartolomeo, Giuli, Manzo (2009) incorporate the uncertainty about the fiscal multiplier into the model by Dixit, Lambertini (2003b) . They show that even if the government and the central bank share output and inflation target levels, multiplicative uncertainty does not allow them to achieve these targets. In equilibrium output is too low and inflation is too high. In other words, inflation bias is present. Di Bartolomeo, Giuli (2011) For example, Sibert (2002) analyses the design of optimal monetary policy in a multiperiod model, when society does not know the central bank preferences. Sibert (2002) shows that due to the reputation motive of central bankers, average inflation decreases.
Hefeker, Zimmer (2011) point out that under uncertain monetary authority preferences, central bank independence is no longer a sufficient condition for achieving macroeconomic targets.
Hefeker, Zimmer (2011) instead emphasize the primary role of the central bank's conservatism.
In turn, Sorge (2013) also questions the efficiency of delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank in the case of severe model uncertainty. He shows that in some cases it could be optimal to delegate monetary policy to the central bank, which is less conservative than society.
The economic literature describes a number of implications for the uncertainty about policymaker preferences. Nevertheless, none of these studies considers the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Further, the existing research does not deal with uncertain government preferences. In developed countries the problem of uncertain central bank preferences is less significant than uncertain government preferences. For example, the targets of 5 the European Central Bank are clearly defined: inflation less than 2%. Moreover, Blinder et al. (2008) confirm that in recent years the transparency of monetary policy has considerably increased all over the world. This means that the assumption of certain central bank preferences is relevant. At the same time, the transparency of fiscal policies has not significantly changed, although government preferences are exposed to considerable changes in election periods.
Our paper fills this gap. We modify the model of Di Bartolomeo, Giuli, Manzo (2009) by adding the uncertainty about government preferences. As a result, we show that uncertain government preferences do not change the characteristics of macroeconomic policy if the fiscal multiplier is certain. In the case of multiplicative uncertainty, uncertain government preferences lead to a more expansionary monetary policy and a more contractionary fiscal policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model of fiscal and monetary policy interaction. In Section 3 we analyse the impact of uncertain government preferences on macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the main findings and future directions for research.
Model

Model framework
We modify the model of Di Bartolomeo, Giuli, Manzo (2009) by introducing uncertain government preferences. The economy is described by the standard aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions:
where  is the rate of inflation, e  is the expected rate of inflation, y is the level of real output, y is the natural level of real output,  is the instrument of fiscal policy (for example, transfers), m is the monetary policy instrument (for example, the growth rate of the money supply).
Following the traditional macroeconomic approach (see Kydland, Prescott (1977) ), the target level of output exceeds the natural level of output: y y  * . Following Di Bartolomeo, Giuli, Manzo (2009), we assume that fiscal multiplier  is a random variable with mean 1 and variance 2   . Thus, 2   characterizes the degree of multiplicative uncertainty.
The losses of the government and the central bank are given by the following functions: (1) and (2), we obtain the optimal action G  for the government of type
where  
Thus, (4) represents the function of the government response to central bank action. From
. This means that the government responds to an 4 The special case with uniformly distributed G  is presented in Kuznetsova, Merzlyakov (2015) . increase of m with a contractionary policy (for example, by reducing transfers). It should be noted that this effect weakens with a rise of multiplicative uncertainty ( 0
Using the government response function (4) we obtain the average government action
where
is the implicit characteristic of the distribution of Note that for two different cumulative distribution functions
. Thus, for the distribution of G  with higher variance  is higher. In other words,  characterizes the uncertainty about government preferences.
Minimizing the central bank losses, we obtain the central bank response function:
The optimal monetary action m decreases with an increase in  . After finding the intersection of the response functions (5) and (6) we define the level of inflation expectations:
Next, we substitute the inflation expectations at the intersection point and define the parameters of equilibrium.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium values of monetary action m , government action 
We start the analysis of equilibrium (8) (9) (10) With the use of (11) and (12) we arrive at Proposition 2. This result is in line with Di Bartolomeo, Giuli, Manzo (2009), who show that for multiplicative uncertainty the government and the central bank cannot achieve their targets even if they share them. Thus, we demonstrate that preference uncertainty aggravates the inflation bias problem. We analyse in detail the origins of this effect in Section 3.
Uncertain government preferences
As stated earlier, the variance of G  characterizes the uncertainty about government preferences. Comparing equilibria for different distributions we come to the following results. 
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature on macroeconomic policy under uncertainty. Although various implications of uncertainty have been well studied, considerable 11 gaps in this area still remain. For instance, the problem of uncertain government preferences deserves more attention and requires further analysis.
In this paper we consider the impact of uncertain government preferences on the main characteristics of macroeconomic policy. Our analysis shows that if the fiscal multiplier is known, uncertain government preferences do not affect macroeconomic equilibrium. In the case of multiplicative uncertainty, uncertain government preferences make fiscal policy more contractionary, while monetary policy becomes more expansionary. As a result, expected inflation rises and expected output drops. Thus, the inflation bias problem worsens.
The problem of different forms of strategic interaction is beyond the scope of our paper:
we consider that the government and the central bank conduct their policies simultaneously and independently. The analysis of the influence of uncertain government preferences on macroeconomic policy for various forms of strategic interaction is a promising avenue for further research.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
From (4) we can see that the influence of G  on government action G  depends on the sign of expression  
Substituting the equilibrium values (8-10) into expression  
we obtain:
As ) * ( y y  is positive, the sign of (A1.3) coincides with the sign of denominator   
The right-hand side of (A1.4) can be further rewritten as: . So, using (A1.4) and (A1.5), we conclude that Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
As we have seen, the distribution of higher variance is characterized by a higher value of  :
(A2.1)
With (A2.1) and definitions (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) from the main text, Proposition 3 follows directly. . If all government types choose the same action, the average action also equals this level. Substituting the average government action into (6), (1) and (2), we immediately arrive at Proposition 4.
Q.E.D.
